"Overlearning" means that a model trained for a seemingly simple objective implicitly learns to recognize attributes that are (1) statistically uncorrelated with the objective, and (2) sensitive from a privacy or bias perspective. For example, a binary gender classifier of facial images also learns to recognize races-even races that are not represented in the training data-and identities. We demonstrate overlearning in several image-analysis and NLP models and analyze its harmful consequences. First, inference-time internal representations of an overlearned model reveal sensitive attributes of the input, breaking privacy protections such as model partitioning. Second, an overlearned model can be "repurposed" for a different, uncorrelated task. Overlearning may be inherent to some tasks. We show that techniques for censoring unwanted properties from representations either fail, or degrade the model's performance on both the original and unintended tasks. This is a challenge for regulations that aim to prevent models from learning or using certain attributes.
Introduction
We demonstrate that deep models trained for seemingly simple objectives discover generic features and representations that (1) enable the model to perform uncorrelated tasks, and (2) reveal privacyor bias-sensitive attributes of the model's inputs. We call this phenomenon overlearning. For example, a binary classifier trained to infer the gender of a facial image also learns to recognize races (including races not represented in the training data) and even identities of individuals.
It has been observed that models trained for rich objectives such as ImageNet learn complex representations that enable related tasks [2, 38] . Similarly, models trained to distinguish coarse classes also learn to distinguish their subsets [14] . By contrast, overlearning manifests when a model trained for a simple objective unintentionally learns uncorrelated, privacy-or bias-sensitive concepts. Overlearning does not involve any changes to the training data or algorithms.
Overlearning has two distinct consequences. First, given the model's inference-time representation of an input, one can predict sensitive attributes of this input, e.g., a facial recognition model's representation of an image reveals if two specific individuals appear together in it. Overlearning thus breaks inference-time privacy protections based on model partitioning [3, 30, 35] . Second, we show how to use transfer learning to "re-purpose" models for uncorrelated, privacy-violating tasks.
As the first step towards understanding if overlearning is inherent for some tasks, we apply censoring [28, 36] to try and prevent the model from learning unwanted attributes. Censoring either prevents the model from learning its omain task, or else produces representations that still leak sensitive attributes. Further, censoring cannot suppress attributes that are not present in the training data-yet recognized by the overlearned models. We discuss the implications for policies and regulations such as GDPR [9] that aim to ensure fairness and privacy in ML models.
M transfer = C transfer • E l can then be fine-tuned on another, small dataset D transfer , which in itself is not sufficient to train an accurate model for the new task. Utilizing features learned by M on the original D, M transfer can achieve better results than models trained from scratch on D transfer .
The feasibility of model re-purposing in the absence of the original training data complicates the application of policies and regulations such as GDPR [9] . GDPR requires data processors to disclose every purpose of data collection and obtain consent from the users whose data was collected. Given a trained model, it is not clear how to determine-nor, consequently, disclose or obtain user consent for-what the model has learned. Learning itself thus cannot be a regulated "purpose" of data collection. It may be possible to regulate how a model is applied, but regulators must be aware that even if the data has been erased, a model can be converted to a different objective, which may not have been envisioned at the time of original data collection. We discuss this further in Section 6.
Model Partitioning and Censoring Representations
Model partitioning splits the model into a local, on-device part and a remote, cloud-based part. The motivations are better scalability of inference [16, 20] and protecting privacy of inputs into the model [3, 23, 30, 35] . To protect privacy, the local part of the model computes a representation, it is censored as described below and sent to the cloud part, which computes the model's output.
The goal of censoring is encode input x into a representation z such that z does not reveal unwanted properties of x, yet is expressive enough to be used for predicting the task label y. Censoring has been used to achieve transform-invariant representations for computer vision, bias-free representations for fair machine learning, and privacy-preserving representations that hide sensitive attributes.
Adversarial training. A straightforward censoring approach is based on adversarial training [11] . It involves a mini-max game between an adversarial discriminator D trying to infer s from z during training and the encoder trying to infer the task label y while minimizing the discriminator's success [4, 7, 8, 12, 15, 24, 36] . The mini-max game is formulated as:
where γ balances the two log likelihood terms. The inner optimization maximizes log p(s|z = E(x)), i.e., the discriminator's prediction of the sensitive attribute s given a representation z. The outer optimization, on the other hand, trains the encoder and classifier to minimize the log likelihood of the discriminator predicting s and maximize that of predicting the task label y.
Information-theoretical censoring. Another approach casts censoring as a single informationtheoretical objective. The requirement that z not reveal s can be formalized as an independence constraint z ⊥ s, but independence is intractable to measure in practice, thus the requirement is relaxed to a constraint on the mutual information between z and s [28, 30] . The overall training objective of censoring s and predicting y from z can thus be formulated as:
where I is mutual information and β, λ are the balancing coefficients (β = 0 in [30] ). The first two terms I(z, y) − βI(z, x) is the objective of variational information bottleneck [1] , the third term is the relaxed independence constraint of z and s.
Intuitively, this objective aims to maximize the information of predicting y in z as per I(z, y), forget the information of x in z as per −βI(z, x), and remove the information of s in z as per −λI(z, s).
The model effectively learns z as a compressed encoding of x uninformative of s and retaining only the information useful for predicting y. This objective has a analytical lower bound [28] :
where KL is Kullback-Leibler divergence and log p(x|z, s) is the reconstruction likelihood of x given z and s. The conditional distributions p(y|z) = C(z), q(z|x) = E(x) are modeled as in adversarial training and p(x|z, s) is modeled with a decoder R(z, s) = p(x|z, s). UTKFace is a set of over 23,000 face images labeled with age, gender, and race [34, 41] . We rescale them into 50×50 RGB pixels. The task is to predict gender; the sensitive attribute is race.
FaceScrub is a set of 100K face images labeled with gender and identity [10] . Some URLs are expired, but we were able to download 74,000 images for 500 individuals and rescaled them into 50×50 RGB pixels. The task is to predict gender; the sensitive attribute is identity.
Places365 is a set of 1.8 million images labeled with 365 fine-grained scene categories. We use a subset of 73,000 images, 200 per category. The task is to predict whether the scene is indoor or outdoor; the sensitive attribute is the fine-grained scene label.
Twitter is a set of tweets from the PAN16 dataset [32] labeled with user information. We removed tweets with fewer than 20 tokens and users with fewer than 50 tweets, yielding a dataset of over 46,000 tweets from 151 users with an over 80,000-word vocabulary. The task is to predict the age of the user given a tweet; the sensitive attribute is the author's identity.
Yelp is a set of Yelp reviews labeled with user identities [37] . We removed users with fewer than 1,000 reviews and reviews with more than 200 tokens, yielding a dataset of over 39,000 reviews from 137 users with over 69,000 vocabularies. The task is to predict the review score between 1 to 5; the sensitive attribute is the author's identity.
PIPA is a set of over 60,000 photos of 2,000 individuals gathered from public Flickr photo albums. Each image can include one or more individuals [31, 40] . We crop the head region of each individual using the annotated bounding boxes. The task is to predict the identity given the head region; the sensitive attribute is whether two head regions are from the same photo.
Models. For Health, we use a two-layer fully connected (FC) neural network with 128 and 32 hidden units, respectively, following [28, 36] . For UTKFace and FaceScrub (easier tasks), we use a LeNet [21] variant: three 3×3 convolutional and 2×2 max-pooling layers with 16, 32, and 64 filters, followed by two FC layers with 128 and 64 hidden units. For Twitter and Yelp, we use text CNN [17] . For PIPA and Place365 (harder tasks), we use AlexNet [19] with convolutional layers pre-trained on ImageNet [5] and further add a 3×3 convolutional layer with 128 filters and 2×2 max-pooling followed by two FC layers with 128 and 64 hidden units, respectively.
Inferring sensitive attributes from representations
We use 80% of the data for training target models and 20% for evaluation. The size of the adversary's auxiliary dataset is 50% of the training data. Success of the inference attack is measured on the final FC layer's representation of test data. The baseline is inference from an uncensored representation. We also censor the representation with γ = 1.0 for adversarial training and β = 0.01, λ = 0.0001 for information-theoretical censoring, following [28, 36] . For adversarial training, we simulate the adversary with a two-layer FC neural network with 256 and 128 hidden units. The number of epochs is 50 for censoring with adversarial training, 30 for the other models. We use the Adam optimizer with the learning rate of 0.001 and batch size of 128.
For our inference model, we use the same architecture as the censoring adversary. For the PIPA inference model, which takes two representations of faces and outputs a binary prediction of whether these faces appeared in the same photo, we use two FC layers followed by a bilinear model: 
, where z 1 , z 2 are the two input representations, h is the two FC layers and σ is the sigmoid function. We train the inference model for 50 epochs with the Adam optimizer, learning rate of 0.001, and batch size of 128. Table 2 reports the results. When representations are not censored, accuracy of inference from the last-layer representations is much higher than random guessing for all tasks, which means models overlearn even in the higher, task-specific layers. When representations are censored with adversarial training, accuracy drops for both the main and inference tasks. Accuracy of inference is much higher than in Xie et al. [36] . They used logistic regression, which is weaker than the training-time censoring adversary network, whereas we use the same architecture for both the training-time and post-hoc adversaries. Information-theoretical censoring reduces accuracy of inference, but it also damages main-task accuracy more than adversarial training for almost all models.
Overlearning can cause a model to recognize even the sensitive attributes that are not represented in the training dataset. We trained a UTKFace gender classifier on datasets consisting of a single race. We then applied the model to test images with four races (White, Black, Asian, Indian) and attempted to infer the race attribute from the model's representations. Inference accuracy is 61.95%, 61.99%, 60.85% and 60.81% for models trained only on, respectively, White, Black, Asian, and Indian images-almost as good as the 62.18% baseline and much higher than random guessing (42.52%). This demonstrates that even when attributes do not appear in the training data, models can still learn useful features to recognize them in the test data.
Effect of censoring strength. Fig. 2 shows that stronger censoring does not help. On FaceScrub and Twitter with adversarial training, increasing γ damages the accuracy of the model on the main task, while accuracy of inference decreases slightly or remains the same. For UTKFace and Yelp, increasing γ improves accuracy of inference. This may indicate that the simulated "adversary" during adversarial training overpowers the optimization process and censoring defeats itself.
For all models with information-theoretical censoring, increasing β reduces the accuracy of inference but can lead to the model not converging on its main task. Increasing λ results in the model not converging on the main task without affecting the accuracy of inference on Health, UTKFace, and FaceScrub. This seems to contradict the censoring objective, but the reconstruction loss in Equation 1 dominates other loss terms, which leads to poor divergence between conditional q(z|x) and q(z), i.e., information about x is still retained in z.
De-censoring. As mentioned in Section 2.1, censored representations can be transformed to make inference easier. We first train an auxiliary model on D aux to predict the sensitive attribute from representations, using the same architecture as in the baseline models. We use the resulting uncensored representations from the last convolutional layer as the target representations for de-censoring transformations. We use a single-layer fully connected neural network as the transformer and set the number of hidden units to be the dimension of the uncensored representation. The inference model operates on top of the transformer network, with the same hyper-parameters as before. Table 3 summarizes the results. On the Health task, there is not much difference since the baseline attack is already similar to the attack on censored representations, leaving little room for improvement. On the other tasks, de-censoring significantly boosts the accuracy of inference from the representations censored with adversarial training. The boost is smaller against information-theoretical censoring because its objective not only censors z with I(z, s), but also forgets x with I(x, z).
Re-purposing models to predict sensitive attributes
To show that the overlearned features are predictive for sensitive attributes, we re-purpose the uncensored baseline models from Section 4.2 by fine-tuning them on a small (2 − 10% of D) set of unseen data D transfer and compare with the models trained from scratch on D transfer . We use 50 epochs of training and batch size of 32; the other hyper-parameters are as in Section 4.2. For all CNN-based models, we use the trained convolutional layers as the feature extractor and randomly initialize the other layers. For Health, we use the first FC layer as the feature extractor. Table 4 shows that the re-purposed models always outperform those trained from scratch, except for the Health task. For Health, we conjecture that the task is simple and D transfer is enough to achieve good performance. FaceScrub and Twitter show the biggest gain. This demonstrates that overlearned representations can be picked up by a small set of unseen data to create a model for predicting sensitive attributes.
Effect of censoring. In previous work, censoring was only applied to the highest layer of the model under the assumption that the adversary can observe only the model's output. In model re-purposing, Table 5 : Effect of censoring on adversarial re-purposing for FaceScrub with γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. δA is the difference in main-task accuracy (second column) between uncensored and censored models; δB is the difference in inferring the sensitive attribute (columns 3 to 7) between the models re-purposed from different layers and the model trained from scratch. Negative values mean reduced accuracy. Heatmaps on the right are the linear CKA similarities between censored and uncensored representations. Numbers 0 through 4 represent layers conv1, conv2, conv3, fc4, and fc5. For each model censored at layer i (x-axis), we measure similarity between the censored and uncensored models at layer j (y-axis). any layer of the model can be used for transfer learning, thus inners layers must be censored, too. We perform the first study of inner-layers censoring and measure its effect on both the original and re-purposed tasks. We use FaceScrub for this experiment and apply adversarial training to every layer with different strengths (γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0). Table 5 summarizes the results. Censoring lower layers (conv1 to conv3) blocks adversarial repurposing, at the cost of reducing the accuracy of the model on the main task. Hyper-parameters must be tuned carefully, e.g. when γ = 1, there is a huge drop in main-task accuracy.
Censored on
To further investigate how censoring in one layer affects the representations learned across all layers, we measure per-layer similarity between censored and uncensored models using linear centered kernel alignment (CKA) [18] -see Table 5 . When censoring is applied to a specific layer, similarity for that layer is the smallest (values on the diagonal). When censoring lower layers with moderate strength (γ = 0.5 or 0.75), similarity between higher layers is still be high; when censoring higher layers, similarity between lower layers is high. Therefore, censoring can block adversarial re-purposing from a specific layer, but the adversary can still re-purpose the representations in the other layer(s) to obtain an accurate model for predicting sensitive attributes.
When and where overlearning happens
To investigate when (during training) and where (in which layer) the models overlearn, we use linear CKA similarity [18] to compare the representations at different epochs of training between models trained for the original task (A) and models trained to predict a sensitive attribute (B). We use UTKFace and FaceScrub for these experiments. 
Related Work
Melis et al. observed that gradient updates revealed by participants in distributed learning leak information about the training batches that is uncorrelated with the training objective [27] . They focus on inferring data properties from the gradients based on this data. We introduce and study overlearning as a generic problem in fully trained models, which helps explain the results of [27] .
Prior work on censoring representations focused on suppressing sensitive demographic attributes and identities in the model's output for fairness and privacy. Techniques include adversarial training [7] , which has been applied to census and health records [36] , text [4, 8, 24] , images [12] and sensor data of wearables [15] . An alternative to adversarial training is to minimize mutual information between the representation and the sensitive attribute [28, 30] . We have shown neither censoring technique can prevent overlearning, except at the cost of destroying the model's accuracy.
Prior work on transferability of representations focused on related tasks. Transferability of features decreases as the distance between the base and target tasks increases on ImageNet [38] , and there is a correlation between the performance of tasks and their distance from the source task [2] . When training to distinguish coarse classes, CNNs implicitly discover features that distinguish their subsets [14] . By contrast, we study transferability of representations between uncorrelated classes.
Feature minimization of training data is a proposed protection against data misuse [22] . Adversarial model re-purposing can cause a misuse even if the original training data is no longer available.
Conclusions and Implications
Why is censoring ineffective? The original motivation for censoring is fairness. For fairness, it is sufficient to censor the model's final layer to ensure that the output is independent of the sensitive attributes or satisfies a specific fairness constraint [25, 26, 33, 39] . As our experiments show, this does not ensure that the model has not learned to recognize sensitive attributes, nor use them internally. Intuitively, censoring the final layer only mitigates the output bias, but not internal bias.
There is an important technical distinction between fairness and privacy. Privacy may require that the model not learn the sensitive attribute in the first place, not just that it's not leaked by the model's output. Censoring achieves this only at the cost of destroying the model's accuracy on its main task.
Furthermore, existing censoring techniques require a "blacklist" of specific attributes to censor, and inputs with these attributes must occur in the training data. It is not clear how to come up with a comprehensive blacklist. We also showed in Section 4.2 that models learn to recognize even attributes not represented in the training data.
Is overlearning inherent? The failure of censoring and the similarity of learned representations across uncorrelated tasks suggest that overlearning may be inherent. Learning for some objectives may not be possible without recognizing generic low-level features that inevitably enable other tasks, including inference of sensitive attributes. For example, there may not exist a set of features that enables a model to accurately determine the gender of a face but not its race or even identity. This is challenge for regulations such as GDPR that aim to control the purposes and uses of machine learning technologies. To protect privacy and ensure fairness, users and regulators may desire that models not learn certain features and attributes. If overlearning is inherent, it may not be technically possible to enumerate, let alone control, what models are learning. Therefore, regulators should focus on ensuring that models are applied in a way that respects privacy and fairness, while acknowledging that they may still recognize and use protected attributes internally.
